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Abstract
Search has played a fundamental role in computer game research since
the very beginning. And while online search has been commonly used in
perfect information games such as Chess and Go, online search methods for
imperfect information games have only been introduced relatively recently.
This paper addresses the question of what is sound search in an imperfect
information setting of two-player zero-sum games? We argue that the
fixed-strategy definitions of exploitability and epsilon-Nash equilibria are ill
suited to measure the worst-case performance of an online search algorithm.
We thus formalize epsilon-soundness, a concept that connects the worst-
case performance of an online algorithm to the performance of an epsilon-
Nash equilibrium. As epsilon-soundness can be difficult to compute in
general, we also introduce a consistency framework – a hierarchy that
connects the behavior of an online algorithm to a Nash equilibrium. Our
multiple levels of consistency describe in what sense an online algorithm
plays “just like a fixed Nash equilibrium”. These notions further illustrate
the difference in perfect and imperfect information settings, as the same
consistency guarantees have different worst-case online performance in
perfect and imperfect information games. Our definition of soundness and
the consistency hierarchy finally provide appropriate tools to analyze online
algorithms in imperfect information games. We thus inspect some of the
previous online algorithms in a new light, bringing new insights into their
worst case performance guarantees.
1 Introduction
From the very dawn of computer game research, search was a fundamental component of
many algorithms. Turing’s chess algorithm from 1950 was able to think two moves ahead
[Cop04], and Shannon’s work on chess from 1950 includes an extensive section on how an
evaluation function can be used within search [Sha50]. Samuel’s checkers from 1959 already
combine search and learning of a value function, which is approximated through self-play
method and bootstrapping [Sam59]. The combination of search and learning has been a
crucial component in the remarkable milestones where computers outperformed their human
counterparts in long standing challenging games: DeepBlue in Chess [CHH02], AlphaGo in
Go [Sil+17], DeepStack and Libratus in Poker [Mor+17; BS18].
As online search methods for approximating Nash equilibria in imperfect information games
appeared only in the last few years [LLB15; BS17; Mor+17; BS18; BS19], we investigate
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what it takes for an online algorithm to be sound in imperfect information settings. While
it has been known that search with imperfect information is more challenging than with
perfect information [FB98; LLB15], the problem is maybe more complex than previously
thought. Online algorithms “live” in a fundamentally different setting, and they need to be
evaluated appropriately.
Previously, the common approach to evaluate online algorithms was to compute a corre-
sponding offline strategy by “querying” the online algorithm at each state (“tabularization”
of the strategy) [LLB15; ŠKL19]. One would then report the exploitability of the resulting
offline strategy. We show that not only is this not generally possible, naive tabularization can
also lead to incorrect conclusions about the worst-case performance of the online algorithm.
As a consequence we show that some algorithms previously considered to be sound are not.
We first give a simple example of how an online algorithm can lose to an adversary in a
repeated game setting, while being seemingly unexploitable based on a naive tabularization.
We build on top of this example to introduce a framework for evaluating the performance
of an online algorithm. Within this framework, we introduce the definition of a sound and
-sound algorithm. Like the exploitability of a strategy in the offline setting, the soundness of
an algorithm is a measure of if its performance against a worst case adversary. Importantly,
this notion collapses to the previous notion of exploitability when the algorithm follows a
fixed strategy profile.
We then introduce a consistency framework, a hierarchy that allows us to formally state
in what sense an online algorithm plays “consistently” with an -equilibrium. This allows
to state multiple bounds on the soundness of the algorithm, based on the -equilibrium
and the type of consistency. The stronger the consistency in our hierarchy, the stronger
the bounds. This further illustrates the discrepancy of search in perfect and imperfect
information settings, as these bounds sometimes differ for perfect and imperfect information
games.
Our definitions of soundness and the consistency hierarchy finally provide appropriate tools
to analyze online algorithms in imperfect information games. We thus inspect some of
the previous online algorithms in a new light, bringing new insights into their worst case
performance guarantees. Namely, we focus on the Online Outcome Sampling (OOS) [LLB15]
algorithm. Consider the following statement from the OOS publication: “We show that
OOS is consistent, i.e. it is guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium strategy as search time
increases. To the best of our knowledge, this is not the case for any existing online game
playing algorithm...” The problem is that OOS provides only the weakest of our introduced
consistencies – local consistency. As the local consistency gives no guarantee for imperfect
information games (in contrast to perfect information games), OOS (and potentially other
locally consistent algorithms) can be highly exploited by an adversary. Our experimental
section then verifies this issue for OOS in two small imperfect information games.
2 Background
We present our results using the recent formalism of factored-observations games [Kov+19].
The entirety of the paper trivially applies to the extensive form formalism [OR94] as well
(as we are only relying on the notion of states and rewards). We believe this choice of
formalism makes it easier to incorporate our definitions in the future online algorithms,
as sound search in imperfect information critically relies on the notion of common/public
information [BJB14]. Indeed, all the recently introduced search algorithms in imperfect
information games rely on these notions [Mor+17; BS18; ŠKL19].
Definition 1. A factored-observations game is a tuple G = 〈N ,W,wo,A,T ,R,O〉, where:
• N = {1, 2} is a player set. We use symbol n for a player and -n for its opponent.
• W is a set of world states and w0 ∈W is a designated initial world state.
• A = A1 × ·· · × AN is a space of joint actions. The subsets An(w) ⊂ An and
A(w) = A1(w)× ·· · ×AN (w) ⊂ A specify the (joint) actions legal at w ∈ W. For
a ∈ A, we write a= (a1, . . . ,aN ). An(w) for n ∈N are either all non-empty or all
empty. A world state with no legal actions is terminal.
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• After taking a (legal) joint action a at w, the transition function T determines the
next world state w′, drawn from the probability distribution T (w,a) ∈ ∆(W).
• R= (R1, . . . ,RN ), and Rn(w,a) is the reward player n receives when a joint action
a is taken at w.
• O = (Opriv(1), . . . ,Opriv(N),Opub) is the observation function, where O(·) : W ×
A×W → O(·) specifies the private observation that n receives, resp. the public
observation that every player receives, upon transitioning from world state w to w′
via some joint action a.
A legal world history (or trajectory) is a finite sequence h= (w0,a0,w1,a1, . . . ,wt), where
wk ∈W , ak ∈ A(wk), and wk+1 ∈W is in the support of T (wk,ak). We denote the set of all
legal histories by H, and the set of all sub-sequences of h that are legal histories as H(h)⊆H.
Since the last world state in each h ∈ H is uniquely defined, the notation for W can be
overloaded to work with H (e.g., A(h) := A(the last w in h), h being terminal, ...). We
use Z to denote the set of all terminal histories, i.e. histories where the last world state is
terminal.
The cumulative reward of n at h is
∑t−1
k=0 r
k
n :=
∑t−1
k=0Rn(wk,ak). When h is a terminal
history, cumulative rewards can also be called utilities, and denoted as un(z). We assume
games are zero-sum, so un(z) = −u-n(z) ∀z ∈ Z. The maximum difference of utilities is
∆= |maxz∈Z u1(z)−minz∈Z u1(z)|
Player n’s information state or private history at h = (w0,a0,w1,a1, . . . ,wt) is the action-
observation sequence sn(h) := (O0n,a0n,O1n,a1n, . . . ,Otn), where Okn =On(wk−1,ak−1,wk). The
space Sn of all such sequences can be viewed as the private tree of n.
A strategy profile is a tuple σ = (σ1, . . . ,σN ), where each (behavioral) strategy σn : sn ∈
Sn 7→ σn(sn) ∈ ∆(An(sn)) specifies the probability distribution from which player n draws
their next action (conditional on having information sn). We denote the set of all strategies
of player n as Σn and the set of all strategy profiles as Σ.
The reach probability of a history h ∈ H under σ is defined as piσ(h) = piσ1 (h)piσ2 (h)piσc (h),
where each piσn(h) is a product of probabilities of the actions taken by player n between
the root and h, and piσc (h) is the product of stochastic transitions. The expected utility for
player n of a strategy profile σ is un(σ) =
∑
z∈Z pi
σ(z)un(z).
We define a best response of player n to the other players strategies σ-n as
the strategy br (σ-n) ∈ argmaxσ′n∈Σn un(σ′n, σ-n) and best response value brv(σ-n) =
maxσ′n∈Σn un(σ
′
n, σ-n). The profile σ is an -Nash equilibrium if (∀n ∈N ) : un(σ) ≥
maxσ′n∈Σn un(σ
′
n,σ-n)− , and we denote the set of all -equilibrium strategies of player n
as NEn. The strategy exploitability is expln(σn) :=
[
un(σ∗)−minσ′-n∈Σ-n un(σn,σ′-n)
]
where
σ∗ is an equilibrium strategy. The game value u∗ = u1(σ∗) is the utility player 1 can achieve
under a Nash equilibrium strategy profile.
3 Online Search
The environment we are concerned with is that of a repeated game, consisting of a sequence
of individual matches. As a match progresses, the algorithm produces a strategy for a
visited information state on-line: that is, once it actually observes the state. This common
framework of repeated games is particularly suitable for analysis of online algorithms, as
the online algorithm can be conditioned on the past experience (e.g. by trying to adapt to
the opponent or by re-using parts of the previous computation). We are then interested in
the accumulated reward of the agent during the span of the repeated game. Of particular
interest will be the expected reward against a worst-case adversary.
3.1 Coordinated Matching Pennies
We now introduce a small imperfect information game that will be used throughout the article
– “Coordinated Matching Pennies” (CMP). It is a variation on the well-known Matching
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Pennies game [OR94], where we additionally introduce a publicly observable chance event
just after the first player acts. See Figure 1 for details.
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Figure 1: Coordinated Matching
Pennies. Blue vertical lines rep-
resent information states of the
second player.
Let p and q denote the probability of playing Heads in
information states s1 and s2 respectively. An equilibrium
strategy for the second player (Blue) is then any strategy
that satisfies p+ q = 1. He thus has to coordinate the
actions between his two information states. The first player
has a unique uniform equilibrium. Similar coordination
happens also in Kuhn Poker, where equilibria of the first
player are also parametrized with a single parameter, while
the other player has a unique equilibrium as well [Kuh50].
3.2 Naive Tabularization
We now show that if one naively tries to convert an online
algorithm into a fixed strategy, the resulting exploitability
is not always representative of the worst-case performance
of the online algorithm. Consider the following algorithm
PlayCache for the repeated game of CMP. PlayCache keeps an internal state, a cache – a
mapping of information state to probability distribution over the actions, and it gradually
fills the cache during the game
Concretely, PlayCache plays for the second player as follows:
• Initialize algorithm’s state θ0 to an empty cache.
• Given an information state s visited during a game, there are three possible cases:
i) The cache is empty: play Heads and store {s,Heads} into the cache. ii) The
cache is non-empty and contains s: play the cached strategy for s. iii) The cache is
non-empty and does not contain s: play Tails and store {s,Tails}.
Consider what happens if one tries to naively tabularize the PlayCache by querying the
algorithm for all the information states. If we query the algorithm for states s1, s2, we get
the resulting offline strategy s1 : Heads, s2 : Tails. Querying the algorithm for states in
reverse order, i.e. s2, s1 results in s1 : Tails, s2 :Heads. And while both of these offline
strategies have zero exploitability, one can still exploit the algorithm during the repeated
game. This follows from the fact that the very first time the PlayCache gets to act, it
always plays Heads. The first player can thus simply play Heads during the first match
and is guaranteed to win the match. As we will show later, PlayCache falls within a class of
algorithms that can be exploited, but where the average reward is guaranteed to converge to
the game value as we repeatedly keep playing the game.
Where did this discrepancy between the exploitability of the tabularized strategy and the
exploitability of the online algorithm come from? It is simply because the tabularized
strategy does not properly describe the game dynamics of PlayCache. In fact, there is no
fixed strategy that does so! We will now formalize an appropriate framework to describe
the rewards and dynamics of online algorithms, which will allow us to define notions for the
expected reward and the worst-case performance in the online setting.
3.3 Online Settings
The repeated game p consists of a finite sequence of k individual matches p =
(z1, z2, . . . , zk), where each match zi ∈ Z is a sequence of world states and actions
zi = (w0i , a0i , w1i , a1i . . . , a
li−1
i , w
li
i ), ending in a terminal world state w
li
i . For each visited
world state in the match, there is a corresponding information state, i.e. a player’s private
perspective of the game (for perfect information games, the notion of information state and
world state collapse as the player gets to observe the world perfectly). An online algorithm Ω
then simply maps an information state observed during a match to a strategy, while possibly
using its internal algorithm state (Def. 2).
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Given two players Ω1,Ω2, we use P kΩ1,Ω2 to denote the distribution over all the possible
repeated games p of length k when these two players face each other. The average reward of
p is Rn(p) = 1/k
∑k
i=1un(zi) and we denote Ep∼Pk
Ω1,Ω2
[Rn(p)] to be the expected average
reward when the players play k matches. From now on, if player n is not specified, we
assume without loss of generality it is player 1. The proofs of the theorems can be found in
Appendix C.
Definition 2. Online algorithm Ω is a function Sn ×Θ 7→ ∆(An(sn))×Θ, that maps an
information state sn ∈ Sn to the strategy σn(sn) ∈ ∆(An(sn)), while possibly making use
of algorithm’s state θ ∈ Θ and updating it. We denote the algorithm’s initial state as θ0.
A special case of an online algorithm is stateless search, where the output of the function
is independent of the algorithm’s state (thus independent of the previous matches). If the
output depends on the algorithm’s state, we say the search is stateful.
As the game progresses, the online algorithm produces strategies for the visited information
states and updates its algorithm state. This allows it to potentially output different strategies
for the same information state visited in different matches. We thus use Ωp(sn) to denote
the resulting strategy in the information state sn after the algorithm has already played the
matches p= z1, . . . , zk. Note that players can not visit the same information state twice in a
single match.
Remark 3. The interpretation of the algorithm’s state is up to the specific implementation
of the algorithm. If we need to encode a stochastic algorithm, we can do it formally as taking
the initial state to be a realization of a random variable. The initial state should be extended
to encode how the algorithm should act (seemingly) randomly in any possible game-play
situation beforehand.
3.4 Soundness of Online Algorithm
We are now ready to formalize the desirable properties of an online algorithm in our settings.
Exploitability / -equilibrium considers the expected utility of a fixed strategy against a
worst-case adversary in a single match. We thus define a similar concept for the settings
of an online algorithm in a repeated game: -soundness. Intuitively, an online algorithm is
-sound if and only if it is guaranteed the same reward as if it followed a fixed -equilibrium.
Definition 4. For an -sound online algorithm Ω, the expected average reward against any
opponent is at least as good as if it followed an -Nash equilibrium fixed strategy σ for any
number of matches k:
∀k ∀Ω2 : Ep∼Pk
Ω,Ω2
[R(p)]≥ Ep∼Pk
σ,Ω2
[R(p)]. (1)
Note that this definition guarantees that an online algorithm that simply follows a fixed
-equilibrium is -sound. And while the online algorithm can certainly play as a fixed strategy,
online algorithms are far from limited to doing so. (e.g. PlayCache from Section 3). The
-soundness for k = 1 of PlayCache is 1, showing that this algorithm is highly exploitable.
Additionally, an online algorithm may be sound (= 0), but there might not be any offline
equilibrium that produces the same distribution of matches (example in Appendix A).
3.5 Response Game
To compute the -soundness as in Def. (4), we construct a repeated game [OR94] in the FOG
formalism, where we replace the decisions of the online algorithm with stochastic (chance)
transitions. As we allow the online algorithm to be stateful and thus produce strategies
depending on the game trajectory, the response game must also reflect this possibility. The
resulting game GkΩ is thus exponential in size as it reflects all possible trajectories of k
matches. We call this single-player game a k-step response game.
The k-step response game allows us to compute the best response value of a worst-case
adversary in k-match game-play. We will use overloaded notation brv(GkΩ) to denote this
value.
Theorem 5. If ∀k brv(GkΩ)≤ k, then algorithm Ω is -sound.
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3.6 Tabularized Strategy
When an online algorithm produces the same strategy for an information state regardless
of the previous matches, there is no need for the k-response game. Fixed strategy notion
sufficiently describes the behavior of the online algorithm and thus the exploitability of the
fixed strategy matches the soundness. To compute this fixed strategy, one simply queries the
online algorithm for all the information states in the game. See Appendix B for a formal
definition of the tabularized strategy that also handles the case of stochastic algorithms.
4 Relating -Soundness and -Nash
Unfortunately, our notion of -soundness is often infeasible to reason about. In this section,
we introduce the concept of consistency that allows one to formally state that the online
algorithm plays “consistently” with an -equilibrium. Our consistency notion allows us to
directly bound the -soundness of an online algorithm. We introduce three hierarchical levels
of consistency, with varying restrictions and corresponding bounds.
4.1 Local Consistency
Local consistency simply guarantees that every time we query the online algorithm, there is
an -equilibrium that is consistent with the produced behavioral strategy. All algorithms are
locally consistent with some -equilibria.
Definition 6. Algorithm Ω is locally consistent with -equilibria if
∀k ∀p= (z1, z2, . . . , zk) ∀h ∈H(zk) ∃σ ∈NEn : Ω(z1, ...,zk−1)(s(h)) = σ(s(h)). (2)
While this suggests that the algorithm plays like some equilibrium, it is not so, and the
resulting strategy can still be highly exploitable. This is because one cannot combine local
behavioral strategies from different -equilibria and hope to preserve their exploitability.
Consider the CMP game with two strategies σ1 = {(s1,p= 1),(s2, q = 0)} and σ2 = {(s1,p=
0.5),(s2, q = 0.5)}. While both strategies are equilibria, if one plays in the states s1 and
s2 based on the first and second equilibrium respectively, it corresponds to an exploitable
strategy {(s1,p= 1),(s2, q = 0.5)}.
Note that this can happen even in perfect information games (example in Appendix A).
Interestingly, local consistency is sufficient if the algorithm is consistent with a subgame
perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 7. In perfect information games, an algorithm that is locally consistent with a
subgame perfect equilibrium is sound.
A particularly interesting example of an algorithm that is only locally consistent is Online
Outcome Sampling [LLB15] (OOS). See Section 5 for detailed discussion and experimental
evaluation, where we show that this algorithm can produce highly exploitable strategies in
imperfect information games.
4.2 Global Consistency
Local consistency guaranteed consistency only for individual states. The problem we have
then seen is that the combination of these visited local strategies might produce highly
exploitable overall strategy. A natural extension is then to guarantee consistency for all the
visited states in combination: global consistency.
Definition 8. Algorithm Ω is globally consistent with -equilibria if
∀k ∀p= (z1, z2, . . . , zk) ∃σ ∈NEn ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} ∀h ∈H(zi) : Ω(z1, ...,zi−1)(s(h)) = σ(s(h)).
(3)
The PlayCache algorithm is globally consistent, but unfortunately we have seen that it is
exploitable during the first match (k = 1).
Theorem 9. An algorithm that is globally consistent with -equilibria might not be -sound.
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But what if the algorithm keeps on playing the repeated game? While the global consistency
with equilibria does not guarantee soundness, it guarantees that the expected average reward
converges to the game value in the limit.
Theorem 10. For an algorithm Ω that is globally consistent with -equilibria,
∀k ∀Ω2 : Ep∼Pk
Ω,Ω2
[R(p)]≥ u∗− −
∣∣S1∣∣∆
k
, (4)
4.3 Strong Global Consistency
Essentially, the problem with global consistency is that it guarantees the existence of
consistent equilibrium for any game-play after the game-play is generated. Strong global
consistency additionally guarantees that the game-play itself is generated consistently with
an equilibrium; and as in global consistency, the partial strategies for this game-play also
correspond to an -equilibrium. In other words, the online algorithm simply exactly follows
a predefined equilibrium.
Definition 11. Online algorithm Ω is strongly globally consistent with -equilibrium σ if
∀k ∀p= (z1, z2, . . . , zk) ∀h ∈H(zk) : Ω(z1, ...,zk−1)(s(h)) = σ(s(h)). (5)
Strong global consistency guarantees that the algorithm can be tabularized, and the ex-
ploitability of the tabularized strategy matches -soundness of the online algorithm. Canonical
examples of strongly globally consistent search algorithms are DeepStack/Libratus. In gen-
eral, algorithms that use a notion of safe (continual) resolving are strongly globally consistent
as it essentially re-solves some epsilon equilibrium (albeit unknown one) that it follows.
Theorem 12. If a globally consistent algorithm is stateless then it is also strongly globally
consistent.
5 Experiments
A particularly interesting example of an algorithm that is only locally consistent is
OOS [LLB15]. We use it to demonstrate the theoretical ideas in this paper with em-
pirical experiments. We show that local consistency does in fact fail to result in -soundness
in the online setting. The problem we demonstrate is also not specific to OOS, but in general
to any adaptation of an offline algorithm to the online setting where the algorithm attempts
to improve its strategy during online play.
At high level, OOS runs the offline MCCFR algorithm in the full game (while also gradually
building the tree), parametrized to increase the sampling probability of the current informa-
tion state. The algorithm then plays based on the resulting strategy for that particular state.
The problem is that these individual MCCFR runs can converge to different -equilibria as
the MCCFR is parametrized differently in each information state. In other words, the OOS
algorithm exactly suffers from the fact that it is only locally consistent.
We use two games in our experiments: Coordinated Matching Pennies from Section 3 and
Kuhn Poker [Kuh50]. We present the Coordinated Matching Pennies results here. See
Appendix D for the complete experimental details and a similar experiment for Kuhn Poker.
The code for all the experiments can be found at url will be published for camera-ready
version.
Within a single match of Coordinated Matching Pennies, the second player will act either
in s1 or s2. OOS will therefore bias MCCFR samples to whichever information state that
actually occurs in the match. These two situations are distinct and result in two different
strategies for the whole game (including the non-visited state), similarly to the example
in Section 4.1. To emulate what OOS does, we parametrize MCCFR runs to bias samples
into s1 and s2 respectively, and initialize the regrets in s1,s2 so that the MCCFR is likely to
produce diverse sets of strategies. As MCCFR is stochastic, we average the strategies over
3 · 104 random seeds.
In Figure 2 we plot exploitability for the average strategies, and unbiased MCCFR for
reference. The two biased variants of MCCFR actually converge at a similar rate to unbiased
7
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Bias to s2 (MCCFR)
Tabularized strategy (OOS)
Figure 2: While individual MCCFR strategies have low exploitability of ∼ 10−3, the tabular-
ized OOS strategy has high exploitability of 0.17 after 106 iterations.
MCCFR, confirming that OOS is locally consistent: it quickly converges to an -equilibria
for s1 and s2 individually. However, the tabularized strategy — the strategy OOS follows
online — is many orders of magnitude more exploitable even with hundreds of thousands of
online iterations. The problem is that adapting its strategy online at s1 and s2 causes it to
not be globally consistent with any -equilibria.
6 Related literature
There are several known pathologies that occur in imperfect information games that are not
present in the perfect information case. The pathologies that happen in the offline setting
present also a problem in the online setting. In [FB98] they identified two problems: i)
strategy-fusion and ii) non-locality.
These two problems can easily arise for algorithms designed to solve only perfect-information
games, such as mini-max or reinforcement learning algorithms. However, both of these
problems can be captured by the computation of exploitability. The proposed -soundness is
similar in its spirit to non-locality: composition of partial strategies (that correspond to parts
of distinct equilibria) produced by an online algorithm may not be an overall equilibrium
strategy. However -soundness cannot always be computed with simple exploitability. This
problem has not been studied thoroughly in online settings, to our best understanding of the
current literature.
Tabularization has been used in [ŠKL19] to compute an offline strategy and its exploitability.
In [LLB15] they consider computing this tabularization (they refer to it as “brute-force”
approach), but it is a very expensive procedure. Instead they use an “aggregate method”,
which “stitches” strategy from a small number of matches and defines the strategy as
uniform in non-visited information states. They do not state whether such approximation
of tabularization is indeed correct. In [Mor+17; BS18], they use some form of continual
re-solving, which is strongly globally consistent. This guarantees soundness of the algorithms.
7 Conclusion
We first introduced Coordinated Matching Pennies (CMP). This game illustrates the consis-
tency issues that can arise for online algorithms in imperfect information games. Motivated
by the observation that fixed strategy exploitability is not an appropriate measure of an algo-
rithm’s performance in online settings, we introduced a formal framework for studying online
(search) algorithms. This allowed us to define -soundness that just like -exploitability, mea-
sures the performance against the worst-case adversary. Soundness generalizes exploitability
as it collapses to it when an online algorithm follows a fixed strategy. We then introduced a
hierarchical consistency framework that formalizes in what sense an online algorithm can be
consistent with a fixed strategy. Namely, we introduced three levels of consistency i) local ii)
global iii) strongly global, connecting the behavior of an online algorithm to that of a fixed
strategy with increasing tightness. This allowed us to state various bounds on soundness
based on the exploitability of a consistent fixed strategy. Interestingly, the implications are
in some cases different for perfect and imperfect information games.
Within this framework, we see that local consistency in imperfect information games does not
guarantee a worst case performance. Based on this result, we argued that OOS, previously
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considered sound, can be in fact exploited. This illustrates that these subtle problems with
online algorithms can easily be missed. Our experimental section included experiments in
CMP and Kuhn and showed OOS a large discrepancy between the worst case performance
and the bound previously thought to hold.
Extending our results for the case of non-zero sum games and multiple players might be an
interesting path for future work.
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A Consistency Examples
Example 13. An online algorithm may be sound (= 0), but there might not be any offline
equilibrium that produces the same distribution of matches.
Suppose we have a game where each player acts once, chooses from actions {A,B,C} and
receives zero utility (i.e. a normal-form game with 3x3 zero payoff matrix). All strategies are
equilibria. If we play k = 3 matches and the players play pure strategies A, B and C in each
match, we get a distribution of matches p= (z1,z2,z3) that cannot be achieved with fixed
offline equilibrium. In this case, the distribution is ((w0,(A,A)),(w0,(B,B)),(w0,(C,C)))
with probability one, and all other terminal histories with probability zero.
Example 14. An algorithm that is locally consistent with equilibria can be exploited in a
perfect information game.
1
1
0
L R
X Y
Suppose we have a single player game as in figure on the right. Both blue L,Y
and red R,X pure strategies are equilibria. However, if the top node is locally
consistent with the blue strategy, and the bottom node with the red strategy, the
resulting strategy the algorithm actually plays is L,X, which is sub-optimal.
B Tabularization
We can consider two ways how the online setting can be realized, with respect to how players’
state changes between k matches in the repeated game: i) no-memory, where the players take
turns in a match, and their memory is reset when each match is over (players are allowed to
retain memory within the individual matches), or ii) with-memory, where the players are
allowed to retain memory between the matches.
As exploitability of tabularized strategy is guaranteed to reflect -soundness only for strongly
globally consistent algorithms, we assume their use only. The with-memory case then
collapses to the no-memory case: strongly globally consistent algorithm simply plays as some
predefined (offline) equilibrium. The following text then simply defines how to compute the
offline equilibrium by querying the algorithm in all states.
Definition 15 (Partial strategy). For a terminal history z = (w0, a0, w1, a1, . . . , wl, al, wl+1)
player n has a corresponding sequence of information states s= (s0, s1, . . . , sl, sl+1) 3.
We say a partial strategy σΩ,θ0n (z) for player n who uses search Ω and starts with state θ0,
is an expected behavioral strategy defined only for the visited information states:
σΩ,θ0n (z) = {(st, µt) | (µt,θt+1) = Eθt
[
Ω(st,θt)|st
] ∀ t ∈ {0, . . . , l}}.
Note that when we compute the strategy µt from Eθt
[
Ω(st,θt)|st
]
, we must compute it
as a weighted average to respect the structure of the private tree. The weights are reach
probabilities of the information state st: cumulative product of the player’s strategy over the
sequence of information states s0, . . .st−1, leading to target information state st. See [Zin+08,
Eq. 4] for more details.
Definition 16. A composition of partial strategies for terminals Z is a tabularized strategy
σΩ,θ0n (Z) =
⋃
zi∈Z
σΩ,θ0n (zi).
C Proofs of Theorems
Theorem 5. If ∀k brv(GkΩ)≤ k, then algorithm Ω is -sound.
Proof. If we used -equilibrium strategy σ in each response game Gkσ , then the brv(Gkσ) = k ∀k
because adversary can gain at most  in each match. Since -sound algorithm should play at
least as well as some offline -equilibrium, it must have brv(GkΩ)≤ k ∀k.
3We omit the index n for information state sn for clarity.
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Theorem 7. In perfect information games, an algorithm that is locally consistent with a
subgame perfect equilibrium is sound.
Proof. In perfect information games the notions of an information state and a history blend
together, as there is a one-to-one correspondence between them. Expected utility of a history
is the same for all subgame perfect equilibria. It corresponds to the best achievable value
against worst-case adversary, given that the history occurred. This property implies that the
worst-case expected utility of a history remains optimal, if the player plays only actions that
are in the support of any subgame perfect equilibrium in the consequent states. A formal
proof can be constructed by induction on the maximal distance from a terminal history.
Notice that this exactly happens if the player plays according to an algorithm locally
consistent with subgame perfect equilibria. The expected worst-case utility for any history
will be optimal, and the worst-case expected utility of a match will correspond to the worst-
case expected utility of the history at the beginning of the game. Therefore the worst-case
expected utility of each match is also optimal and the algorithm is sound.
Theorem 9. An algorithm that is globally consistent with -equilibria might not be -sound.
Proof. Counter-example can be shown with the toy algorithm PlayCache as in Section 3.
PlayCache is not sound ( = 0), because it can be exploited in the first match.
We will now prepare the ground to prove Thm. 10.
When an algorithm that is globally consistent with an -equilibrium is queried in some
information states in a match in the repeated game, it will always keep playing the same
behavioral strategy in these situations in subsequent matches. We call this as “filling in”
strategy. Once the algorithm fills the strategy in all player’s information states, we are
guaranteed to get match reward of u = u∗−  on average against a worst-case adversary.
Informally speaking, the bound in Thm. 10 can be easily seen to be true for a game like
Coordinated Matching Pennies, or some generalization which will have a larger number of
information states that need to be coordinated (think of “Coordinated Rock-Paper-Scissors”).
At every match, we can incur a loss of at most ∆ when reaching an unfilled history. This is
a rather pessimistic lower bound on the value, but it lets us ignore the algorithm state: we
are either playing at filled information states, or achieving the worst possible value. The
problematic part is making sure the bound holds also when we (repeatedly) visit previously
filled information states. For each of the possible future subgames, there are two cases. In
both cases, the number of ∆-sized losses in utility plus the number of unfilled information
states does not increase, so we can use induction on the length of the game to prove the
claim. Along branches where the opponent had an opportunity to exploit the algorithm by
playing into an unfilled information state, the algorithm loses at most ∆ utility compared
to the equilibrium, but must fill in at least one information state to do so. Along branches
where the agent played through filled information states, the algorithm is playing identically
to the equilibrium strategy and thus achieves the same value.
To prove Thm. 10 we will need to establish a Lemma 17, a bound of difference of utilities a
player can gain if he plays according to a partially filled -equilibrium strategy compared
to u within an arbitrary match. The idea of the proof for Thm. 10 is then to bound this
difference for any number of non-visited information states and any number of remaining
matches within the response game using induction.
An online algorithm can fill in the strategy only into information states found on the trajectory
to a terminal history, as it will be queried only in these situations. So after playing through
a match z = (w0, a0, w1, a1, . . . , wl, al, wl+1), the algorithm’s response at sn(wi) will be fixed
as σ(sn(wi)) for all visited worlds wi on the trajectory z.
To talk about possible filled strategies within a single match, we will partition Z into two
non-empty sets of terminal histories Z• (pronounced “filled”) and Z◦ (pronounced “empty”
or “unfilled”). The partition has a special property of “being possible to realize in online
setting”: all information states on the trajectory to terminals Z• are filled, and all terminals
that can be reached just through these filled information states are also in Z• (we are not
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taking into consideration the opponent’s information states, i.e. we operate only on the
online player’s private tree).
Lemma 17. For a probability of reaching a filled terminal P (•) =∑z•∈Z• piσ(z•), an expected
received utility for filled terminals u(•) =
∑
z•∈Z• pi
σ(z•)u1(z•)∑
z•∈Z• pi
σ(z•)
and an utility of playing outside
of filled histories u(×), it holds that
P (•)(u(•)−u)≥−(1−P (•))(u(×)−u+∆), (6)
assuming 0< P (•)< 1.
Proof. For any strategy profile σ = (σ1,σ2) with an -equilibrium strategy σ1 and arbitrary
opponent strategy σ2 it holds that∑
z•∈Z•
piσ(z•)u1(z•)+
∑
z◦∈Z◦
piσ(z◦)u1(z◦)≥ u. (7)
The terms can be simplified and rewritten as factorization of product of probabilities and
(weighted) utilities as
P (•)u(•) =
∑
z•∈Z•
piσ(z•)︸            ︷︷            ︸
P (•)
·
∑
z•∈Z• pi
σ(z•)u1(z•)∑
z•∈Z•
piσ(z•)︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
u(•)
,
and similarly for the “◦” partition. It also holds that P (•)+P (◦) = 1, as the probability of
reaching a terminal history within a match is equal to one.
We can restate (7) as
P (•)(u(•)−u)+ (1−P (•)(u(◦)−u)≥ 0. (8)
Suppose that for the partition “◦” we didn’t use an equilibrium strategy for player 1, but
arbitrary strategy profile σ′ satisfying P σ(•)+P σ′(◦) = 1. We will denote its utility
u(×) =
∑
z◦∈Z◦ pi
σ′(z◦)u1(z◦)∑
z◦∈Z◦ pi
σ′(z◦)
. (9)
The value of any two strategies cannot differ by more than the maximum difference of utilities
in the game:
u(◦)≤ u(×)+∆. (10)
Putting (10) back to (8), we get the lemma that lower bounds the difference of filled partition
and u for an arbitrary match:
P (•)(u(•)−u)≥−(1−P (•))(u(×)−u+∆). (11)
Theorem 10. For an algorithm Ω that is globally consistent with -equilibria,
∀k ∀Ω2 : Ep∼Pk
Ω,Ω2
[R(p)]≥ u∗− −
∣∣S1∣∣∆
k
, (4)
Proof. Let us rewrite the theorem slightly:
∀k ∀Ω2 : kEp∼Pk
Ω,Ω2
[R(p)]− ku ≥−∣∣S1∣∣∆.
Since R(p) is average reward, multiplying by k we get cumulative utilities in the game-play
p= (z1,z2, . . . , zk):
∀k ∀Ω2 : Ep∼Pk
Ω,Ω2
[
k∑
i=1
u1(zi)
]
− ku ≥−∣∣S1∣∣∆. (12)
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So on the left side of the inequality we have a difference of cumulative (expected) utilities
and of cumulative u. We use cumulative values because we are now in the setting of a
k-repeated game.
Let v be the number of non-visited information states of player 1 (resp. the number of
unfilled information states) in a match, i.e. 0 ≤ v ≤ |S1|, and let l be the number of next
matches (including the current one), i.e. 1≤ l ≤ k. We will use av,l to denote the difference
between expected cumulative rewards and cumulative u from the current match (inclusively)
until the end of the game, if we are playing against worst-case adversary. The left side of (12)
corresponds to a value equal or greater than a|S1|,k, so we need to prove that a|S1|,k ≥−
∣∣S1∣∣∆.
It is sufficient to consider only the worst-case adversary, as the bound on av,l will hold for
any other opponent as well.
We will prove the theorem by induction on av,l using v and l simultaneously. Let us
characterize the base case. If we have visited all information states (v = 0), we filled -
equilibrium strategy everywhere. So at each visit of such a match we receive a reward of u,
and the difference between expected cumulative rewards and cumulative u is zero:
a0,l = 0 ∀l. (13)
The induction hypothesis is
ax,y ≥−x∆ ∀x≤ v ∀y < l. (14)
There are two possibilities of what can happen in a match. We either “hit” the filled
information states, receive some (expected) reward u(v, l) and possibly continue into next
match where we receive av,l−1 (if the current match is not the last one, i.e. l > 1). Or we
“miss” the filled information states, meaning we visit arbitrary number of new information
states previously not visited. This will also change v to be smaller for all subsequent matches.
We state this with an abuse of notation as
av,l = P (v, l)(u(v, l)−u+ av,l−1)
+P (v− 1, l)(u(v− 1, l)−u+ av−1,l−1)
+P (v− 2, l)(u(v− 2, l)−u+ av−2,l−1)
+ . . .
+P (v− v, l)(u(v− v, l)−u+ av−v,l−1),
(15)
where the terms P (v− i, l) and u(v− i, l) are defined similarly to how we defined them for
P (•) and u(•). They correspond to the probability and utilities received when we visit i
new (previously unfilled) information states with l remaining matches (including current
one). It holds that P (v, l)+P (v− 1, l)+P (v− 2, l)+ · · ·+P (v− v, l) = 1 as the probability
of reaching a terminal history within a match is equal to one.
By using the induction hypothesis (14) on terms ax,l−1 ∀x < v we get a lower bound
ax,l−1 ≥ −x∆ on all of x. By comparing these bounds we can deduce that av−1,l−1 lower
bounds all of ax,l−1 with
av−1,l−1 ≥−(v− 1)∆. (16)
Using this bound in (15) we get
av,l ≥ P (v, l)(u(v, l)−u+ av,l−1)
+P (v− 1, l)(u(v− 1, l)−u− (v− 1)∆)
+P (v− 2, l)(u(v− 2, l)−u− (v− 1)∆)
+ . . .
+P (v− v, l)(u(v− v, l)−u− (v− 1)∆).
(17)
We can factor it out as
av,l ≥ P (v, l)(u(v, l)−u+ av,l−1)
+ (1−P (v, l))(−(v− 1)∆−u)
+P (v− 1, l)u(v− 1, l)+P (v− 2, l)u(v− 2, l)+ . . . +P (v− v, l)u(v− v, l).
(18)
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We replace the utilities u(v− 1),u(v− 2), . . . , u(v− v) by u(×) from (9):
av,l ≥ P (v, l)(u(v, l)−u+ av,l−1)+ (1−P (v, l))(u(×)−u− (v− 1)∆). (19)
By using the induction hypothesis (14) we get
av,l ≥ P (v, l)(u(v, l)−u− v∆)+ (1−P (v, l))(u(×)−u− (v− 1)∆). (20)
Expanding the terms
av,l ≥ P (v, l)(−v∆)
+ (1−P (v, l))(−(v− 1)∆)
+P (v, l)(u(v, l)−u)
+ (1−P (v, l))(u(×)−u)
(21)
and using Lemma 17 with •= v, l we have
av,l ≥ P (v, l)(−v∆)+ (1−P (v, l))(−(v− 1)∆)
− (1−P (v, l))(u(×)−u+∆)
+ (1−P (v, l))(u(×)−u).
(22)
Simplifying, we get a bound on av,l:
av,l ≥−v∆. (23)
Note that this bound holds also if P (v, l) = 1 or P (v, l) = 0:
• P (v, l) = 0: Then (20) becomes
av,l ≥ u(×)−u− (v− 1)∆.
Using the same argument as in (10),
av,l ≥−∆− (v− 1)∆=−v∆.
• P (v, l) = 1: We use (8), which becomes u(v, l)−u ≥ 0. Then (20) becomes
av,l ≥ u(v, l)−u− v∆≥−v∆.
Since at the beginning of the game-play there are |S1| unfilled information states, we arrive
at the original theorem
a|S1|,k ≥−|S1|∆.
Theorem 12. If a globally consistent algorithm is stateless then it is also strongly globally
consistent.
Proof. The definition of a stateless algorithm implies that for an information state s the
algorithm always produces the same behavioral strategy σ(s) as the search algorithm is
deterministic (all stochasticity is encoded within the algorithm state θ, see Remark 3).
This means that whatever -equilibria the algorithm is globally consistent with is independent
of the current game-play or match number. This allows us to swap the quantifiers:
∀k ∀p= (z1, z2, . . . , zk) ∃σ ∈NEn ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} ∀h ∈H(zi) :Ω(z1, ...,zi−1)(s(h)) = σ(s(h))
(24)
∃σ ∈NEn ∀k ∀p= (z1, z2, . . . , zk) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k} ∀h ∈H(zi) :Ω(z1, ...,zi−1)(s(h)) = σ(s(h)).
(25)
Using the same argument we can treat the different matches zi as an iteration over k, leading
us to strong global consistency
∃σ ∈NEn ∀k ∀p= (z1, z2, . . . , zk) ∀h ∈H(zk) :Ω(z1, ...,zk−1)(s(h)) = σ(s(h)). (26)
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Figure 3: Coordinated Matching Pennies. Left: While individual MCCFR strategies have
low exploitability of ∼ 10−3, the tabularized OOS strategy has high exploitability of 0.17
after 106 iterations. Right: Normalized histograms of probabilities of playing Heads in s1
- p and s2 - q after 106 iterations. The histograms within columns are correlated, as they
approximately satisfy equilibrium condition p+ q = 1. Tabularized strategy, combination of
(p,s1) and (q,s2) violates this constraint, resulting in high exploitability.
D Experiment details
As OOS runs MCCFR samples biased to particular information states, individual MCCFR
runs can converge to different -equilibria, as the MCCFR is parametrized differently in each
information state. Additionally OOS runs in an online setting, where the algorithm is given
a time budget for computing the strategy, and it may make different numbers of samples in
each targeted information state.
We emulate this experimentally by slightly modifying initial regrets to produce distinct
convergence trajectories. We show it is possible to highly exploit the online algorithm: in
fact, it is possible to exploit the algorithm more than the worst of any individual biased
strategies it produces, not just the expected strategies. This modification is sound: the initial
regrets will “vanish” over longer sampling and the strategies will converge to an equilibrium
in the limit. This is justified by the MCCFR regret bound [Lan+09, Theorem 5].
We use two games: Coordinated Matching Pennies (CMP) from Section 3 and Kuhn
Poker [Kuh50]. We use the no-memory online setting. Nash equilibria in both games are
parametrized with a single parameter α ∈ 〈0,1〉 for one player, while the opponent has
only a single unique equilibrium4. In both games, equilibria require the strategies to be
appropriately balanced, an effect of non-locality problem [FB98] present only in imperfect
information games. When we compose the final strategy from partial online strategies, this
balance can be lost, resulting in high exploitability of the composed strategy.
We modify the initial regrets with following procedure:
• Choose a distinct value of α, one for each of the player’s top-most information states
in the game. Compute an equilibrium strategy according to α.
• Directly copy the behavioral strategy into regret accumulators, and multiply them
by a constant µ.
This simple procedure effectively kick-starts the algorithm to produce distinct trajectories
based on α.
4 In CMP, p = α (playing Heads in s1) and q = 1−α (playing Heads in s2). In Kuhn Poker,
constructing equilibrium strategy based on α is more complicated and we refer the reader to [Kuh50]
or [Hoe+05] for more details.
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Figure 4: Kuhn Poker
In Figure 3 and in Figure 4 , we show that individual biased strategies converge to Nash
equilibria, but the tabularized strategy has higher exploitability even than the worst individual
strategy. In CMP, we bias the second player to play in information state s1 (α= 0.5) or s2
(α= 1) information states. In Poker, we bias the first player to play Jack (α= 0), Queen
(α= 1/2) or King (α= 1) card. For both experiments, exploration was set to 0.6, biasing to
0.1, and µ= 500, a small regret that can be accumulated after less than 500 samples. Within
our search framework, the state θ consists of regrets and average strategy accumulators for
all information states, and from the state of the pseudo-random number generator, which
has distinct initial seeds for each match. The expected strategies are estimated as an average
over 3 · 104 seeds. We plot the worst strategy from these individual biased strategies over all
the seeds for all iterations. We plot also MCCFR strategy for reference, to see the influence
of biasing and regret initialization.
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